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Assassination As A Means Of Intervention
The Death of Lumumba-The Rule of Amin
The Utopians have only one aim in war-to gain that object
which would have prevented them from going to war if they had
previously won it ..... .Yet they are more concerned with avoiding
danger than with winning praise and glory. So, as soon as they have
declared war, they have many proclamations set up secretly all at the
same time in the most conspicuous parts of the enemy territory, signed
with their public seal. In these they promise huge rewards if anyone
kills the enemy leader. Then they announce smaller, but not incon-
siderable, rewards for the head of each man whose name is contained
in that same notice. These are the people they consider responsible,
after the leader, for the hostile action against them. Whatever
reward they announce for a killer is doubled if he brings any of the
proscribed to them alive.'
T HOMAS MOORE prescribed assassination as a primary means of
carrying on war in the ideal commonwealth. Although Utopia does
not exist, assassination is used as a means of waging war and as a
means of political change as well. According to St. Thomas Aquinas,
an individual has a right based on "natural law" to resist tyranny, even
to the point of assassination.2 The limitation put upon the assassin ac-
ting under Aquinas' doctrine is simply that his action must be commit-
ted in the interest of the public welfare. Moore legitimizes assassination
in the context of a declared war and Aquinas does the same in a con-
text of intranational tyranny, but neither extends the right of
assassination to those wishing to use it as a means of effecting foreign
policy, or as a valid means of international intervention in the absence
of a declared war. Indeed, neither of these two scholars considers
assassination for this purpose.
IT. MOORE, UTOPIA ch. 8, On Warfare (London 1946) (lst ed. London 1516).
The key phrase is "as soon as they have declared war .... ." This contingency
eliminates the possibility of legitimizing assassination as a means of carrying on foreign
policy without the sanctions of war.
1E. HYAMS, KILLING No MURDER 17 (1969). Hyams justifies assassination as a
means of avoiding war, but fails to distinguish between assassination of a tyrant by his
own people without the interference of foreign nationals (as discussed by Aquinas),
and the assassination of a foreign leader for political or humanitarian advantage of
another government.
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The purpose of this note is to examine political assassination in the
context of international intervention, in the absence of a state of war.
The two principal characters to be examined are Patrice Emergy
Lumumba and Idi Amin Dada. Although Lumumba was apparently
killed by members of a rival political faction of his native Republic of
the Congo, there is evidence of an assassination plot which involved
the United States. There were also Belgian nationals involved in the
actual killing of Lumumba. Idi Amin, on the other hand, is still alive
despite numerous attempts on his life. Lumumba was killed in the tur-
moil following the declaration of independence of the Republic of the
Congo and the withdrawal of the Belgian colonial government. The
reasons for his death were purely political. Although the many at-
tempts on the life of Idi Amin have been politically motivated, the
humanitarian rationalizations for these acts are myriad, considering
the brutal history of Amin's rule.
In analyzing the consequences of foreign assassination in interna-
tional law, there are two factors which must be evaluated: morality
and practicality. The act which requires the taking of a human life
can not be legitimized purely on a basis of expediency. However, prac-
ticality can not be overlooked since it is possible that assassination may
not provide the desired ends of political change or the correction of
human injustice. An assassination can not be found morally justifiable
if it fails to provide a benefit for the common good.
I. PATRICE EMERGY LUMUMBA
A. Background of Events Prior to Assassination
Lumumba was a prominent figure in the independence movement
in the Republic of the Congo, later serving as its first prime minister.
Belgium held the Congo as a colony until June 30, 1960, when in-
dependence was granted.8 Under colonial rule Lumumba had been an
evoluJ, a black who had learned French, and he could therefore enjoy
certain privileges such as access to European courts and rights to pur-
chase real property and alcohol. He had worked as a postal clerk and
as an editor of a magazine. He had been active in an organization of
evolugs and this association had led to his political leadership in the
3M. HAVENS, C. LEIDEN, & K. SCHMITT, THE POLITICS OF ASSASSINATION 127
(1970) [hereinafter cited as M. HAVENS]. See also R. LEMARCHAND, POLITICAL AWAKEN-
ING IN THE BELGIAN CONGO 198-205 (1964). Lemarchand gives an excellent account
of Lumumba's life and political career and also describes the development of the
Mouvement National Congolais in much greater detail.
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Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). The MNC was certainly the
largest political faction in the new Republic and Lumumba was the
obvious choice as the first prime minister.4 The lack of political exper-
tise of the new government, combined with tribal factionalism,
brought about the immediate fragmentation of the MNC and the
political rivalry which eventually led to Lumumba's assassination.
Joseph Kasavubu, president of the new Republic, dismissed
Lumumba in an attempt to further his own political aspirations.
Lumumba, trying to maintain his authority in the infant government,
boldly dismissed Kasavubu. Colonel Joseph Mobutu, in command of
the army, assumed control and suspended all operations of the govern-
ment. Lumumba sought the protection of the United Nations forces
which had been sent to the Congo to assist in the transition of the
government from colonial rule. The United Nations troops set up a
protective guard of armed troops around the palace where Lumumba
was living while serving as prime minister in Leopoldville. Mobutu,
then in nominal control of the country by virture of his political
dominance, placed Lumumba under house arrest. Lumumba was safe
but he was also unable to reach his allies or the people necessary in
order to gain support for his position. On November 27, 1960,
Lumumba decided that he would stand a good chance of regaining his
place in the government if he could muster support for his position in
the MNC. In an effort to accomplish this goal he left the safety of the
U.N. protection and tried to reach his supporters in Stanleyville. He
was captured on December 1, and held in custody for a month and a
half.5
Lumumba and the two companions captured with him, the former
Vice-President of the Senate, Joseph Okito, and the former Minister of
Youth, Maurice Mpolo, were placed on board a plane to be flown to
an unknown destination. The plane landed in Elisabethville, the
capital of Katanga Province. At this early stage of the new Republic,
Katanga was attempting to assert its own independence. 6 Lumumba
had opposed any secession from the new nation and the Katangan
authorities were the most determined enemies of Lumumba and his
4M. HAVENS, supra note 3, at 132.
5Id. at 127. The original destination is not known. It may have been intended
that the plane land in Bakwanga of South Kasai. At the time of the assassination, the
province of Katanga was preparing for a secession from the Republic of the Congo and
the leaders of the province, particularly Tshombe, a pro-Belgian secessionist, were bit-
ter enemies of Lumumba. Elisabethville-is the capital of Katanga Province.
6R. LEMARCHAND, supra note 3, at 245-47.
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followers.7 There seems to be no clear reason for the plane to have
landed in Elisabethville. Perhaps Kasavubu, who seems to have given
the order for the transfer of the prisoners, hoped that the Katanganese
would kill Lumumba and thus eliminate his political rival, without
causing the total alienation of Lumumba's supporters.
Regardless of the reasons for the act, Lumumba was delivered into
the hands of his enemies and was killed." The two prisoners with
Lumumba were also killed. Present at the time of the killings were two
Belgian mercenaries, Colonel Huyghe and Captain Gat. It appears
very likely that one of these two men participated in the killings. 9 One
witness claimed that Lumumba had been beaten so badly that it was
doubtful that he could have survived had he not been shot.
The involvement of the United States in the Lumumba affair was
not made clear until several years after the assassination. Although the
United States did not participate in the assassination, there is evidence
that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), operating in the Republic
of the Congo, was plotting to assassinate Lumumba shortly before his
death.'0 There does not appear to have been any Belgian involvement
other than the presence of the mercenaries at the place of the killings.
The actions of foreign nationals operating without direction from their
native government can not be considered as a foreign political involve-
ment in an assassination." The CIA plans for the assassination of
Lumumba, however, are a blatant example of international interven-
tion in the absence of a state of war.
B. United States Assassination Plans
In a National Security Council meeting on August 18, 1960, Presi-
dent Eisenhower expressed strong concern about Lumuba. This state-
ment was interpreted by Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, as
authority for an assassination attempt.12 Lumumba Was recognized as
7M. HAVENS, supra note 3, at 128 n.4.
8Id.
'Id. at 128 n.4 & 129. The authors do not state who actually pulled the trigger
of the gun, merely that one of the Belgian mercenaries "very probably" shot at least
one of the three prisoners in the presence of high officials of the Katangan provincial
government.
"°AN INTERIM REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, ALLEGED ASSASSINATION
PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS. S. REP. No. 465, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975).
"8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 819 (1967).
"2SENATE REPORT, supra note 10. The record shows testimony supporting all
possible interpretations of the presidential statement. Some of the testimony indicates a
[Vol. 10:197
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having a very strong public appeal, and leaning toward the Soviet
Union. Lumumba had used various methods of coercion and threats to
expedite the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo. He intend-
ed that the Congo acquire sovereignty as soon as possible.' 3 To hasten
the Belgian withdrawal, Lumumba had threatened to enlist the
assistance of Soviet troops. When the difficulties of Belgian troop
withdrawal began, the United Nations sent a peace-keeping force to
maintain order.' 4 After Lumumba was dismissed by Kasavubu, and
after Mobutu had seized control of the government, Lumumba asked
for and was granted the protection of this peace-keeping force.
Eisenhower's statement expressing concern about the strength of
Lumumba in the Congo occurred at a National Security Council
meeting about a month prior to Lumumba's dismissal. However, once
the assassination plot had begun, there was no attempt to terminate
the plans until after Lumumba's death was revealed by the Congolese.
The Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmen-
tal Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities was published
November 20, 1975, and titled Alleged Assassination Plots Involving
Foreign Leaders. '6 The Committee studied five CIA assassination plots:
those against Fidel Castro, Rafael Trujillo, General Rene Schneider,
Ngo Dinh Diem, and Patrice Lumumba. The majority of information
obtained in the study of the plot against Lumumba came from direct
testimony of CIA officers and executive staff officials involved in the
planning of the assassination. The vast majority of the documented
evidence presented consisted of the interpretation of the instructions
and orders cabled to and from the Station Office in Leopoldville.
The day after the National Security Council meeting Allen Dulles
called a CIA operative and explained that the "removal" of Lumumba
was an "urgent and prime objective," the directions for which came
from "high quarters.' 6 The Senate Report noted that "it is clear that
the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, authorized an
assassination plot."' 7 There was, however, no conclusion by the Com-
mittee that President Eisenhower did actually order or authorize the
plot.
presidential assassination order, other testimony is contradictory, and much is vague as
to interpretation of the statement or as to recollection of the statement.
I'M. HAVENS, supra note 3, at 132.
14SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 14.
"sId. at 1-7.
l"Id. at 13.
7Id. at 52.
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One of the early cables from a CIA Station Officer reported that
Kasavubu had been approached with a plan of assassination and that
he had refused to accept the plan because he was reluctant to resort to
violence."8 Two days later, Dulles signed a cable to the Station Officer
authorizing "wider authority" in dealing with the "removal" of
Lumumba.19 The first means of removing Lumumba explored by the
CIA operatives in the Congo seems to have been to encourage Con-
golese nationals to carry out the assassination plans.20 An unnamed
Congolese Senator requested arms for the purpose of equipping a strike
force whose orders included the assassination of Lumumba. 2 1 The
assistance of the CIA in the planned intranational assassination con-
tinued in spite of the fact that Lumumba was in the protective custody
of the United Nations.
The Director of the CIA's covert activities at this time was Richard
Bissel. Bissel asked Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy, to
"explore the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba." 22 Joseph Scheider,
under the direction of Bissel, obtained a poison which was to be used
in the plot. 2" The Station Officer in Leopoldville, Victor Hedgman,
was to arrange for the assassin to use the poison to kill Lumumba. The
poison would leave no clues as to the plot, but rather would give the
impression that Lumumba had died of natural causes. The purpose of
the appearance of a natural death was to enable the United States to
deny any participation in the event.
24
There was a secondary plan to bring about the death of Lumumba
developed in the CIA by Michael Mulroney, a senior officer in the
Directorate for Plans." Mulroney testified before the Committee that
he had been requested to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, but
that had refused to do so on moral grounds. Mulroney did, however,
agree to go to the Congo with the intention of luring Lumumba away
'
8 Id. at 15. This meeting with Kasavubu appears to be the only actual attempt
made to have Lumumba killed by a political rival. After this failure, the CIA resorted
to a plan of more direct means to have Lumumba assassinated.
19 d. at 16.
201d. at 17. The Committee found no evidence that any arms supplied to the
Congolese were ever used in the actual killing of Lumumba, or in any attempt on his
life.
21 d.
2 d. at 19.
"Id. The Station Officer, Victor Hedgman, testified that Scheider had told him
the assassination was being carried out by presidential order.
24Id. at 11-12, 16.
2 Id. at 37.
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from U.N. custody in order that Congolese authorities might ap-
prehend him, thereby minimizing direct involvement by the United
States. When asked if the subject of Lumumba's death at the hand of
the Congolese then in power was discussed with Bissel,
Mulroney replied:
It was I think considered. . .not to have him killed, but then it
would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Con-
golese crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed.2 6
Although Mulroney's plans to lure Lumumba away from his U.N.
sanctuary renders the act less than that of political murder by persons
working for the United States, the end result is the same and only the
degree of direct involvement is altered. There is no evidence that
Mulroney's plans had any effect in the actual event of Lumumba's
leaving U.N. custody. Apparently, the abandonment of his safety was
a calculated risk taken by Lumumba in an effort to reach his
stronghold in Stanleyville.
The Senate Report determined that there was no CIA involvement
in the death of Lumumba in Katanga Province.2 7 The United Nations
authorized an investigation to determine the precise circumstances of
Lumumba's death after officials in Katanga reported that Lumumba
had escaped their custody and was killed by Katanganese tribesmen on
February 12, 1961. The United Nations Commission of Investigation
determined that Lumumba had actually been killed on January 17,
within a very short time after leaving the plane that had flown them to
Elisabethville from Leopoldville. 2s
C. Moral Action and Practical Rationalization
In the context of world order there can be no doubt that the kill-
ing of Lumumba was a morally reprehensible act. The U.N. Commis-
sion of Investigation reported that:
The Commission wishes to put on record its view that President
Kasavubu and his aides, on the one hand, and the provincial govern-
ment headed by Mr. Tshombe on the other, should not escape
responsibility for the death of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Okito, and Mr.
26Id. at 39. Mulroney arrived in Leopoldville on November 3, 1960. At that time
he had no clear plan for luring Lumumba away from U.N. custody. Lumumba left
the palace where he was guarded by U.N. troops and attempted to reach Stanleyville
on November 27. Mulroney had not at that time completed his plans.
2"Id. at 48.
2816 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1961) 118, U.N. Doc. S/4976 (1961).
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Mpolo. For Mr. Kasavubu and his. aides had handed over Mr.
Lumumba and his colleagues to the Katanga authorities knowing full
well, in doing so, that they were throwing them into the hands of
their bitterest enemies. The government of the province of Katanga
in turn not only failed to safeguard the lives of the three prisoners
but also had, by its action, contributed directly or indirectly, to the
murder of the prisoners. 29
If the action of Kasavubu was deserving of such rebuke from the
United Nations, then could the operations of the United States CIA be
any less wrong, since the plans of their operation called for the leading
of Lumumba into the hands of his enemies at the least, and for the
outright assassination of the man at the worst. The evidence shows
that the CIA did not abandon the assassination plot until after the
Congolese announced his death.30 The CIA Base Chief in Elisabethville
sent a cable to headquarters shortly after Lumumba arrived there on
January 17. It read "Thanks for Patrice. If we had known he was com-
ing we would have baked a snake." The cable also explained that they
had no advance warning of Lumumba's arrival and the fate of the
former prime minister was not known."1 The subsequent cable traffic
dealt with attempts to discover where Lumumba was being kept
prisoner. The CIA was not sure whether Lumumba was alive, but this
lack of knowledge supports the contention that they were not involved
in the killings. This explanation is not intended to exonerate the
United States nor to excuse the operations of the CIA, but merely to
give an analysis of the facts.
Bronson Tweedy, Chief of Africa Division, testified that he believed
the operations and planning for the assassination were merely "ex-
ploratory", or an operation which never advanced beyond the planning
stage .3 Tweedy adhered to the claim that the operation was never in-
tended to be completed despite the evidence presented that the toxic
substance brought to the Congo to be used in the assassination had a
limited period of lethality. Tweedy explained that the poison was sent
in order that the plans would be ready for implementation at any
moment.3 3 The fact that there were claims that the plans were never
2 9 d.
30SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 51.
"Id. The cable added that the CIA operative believed that the Congolese central
government did not plan to "liquidate" Lumumba.
s2Id. at 35.
"Ild.
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ordered into operation does not lessen the severity of the actions taken
to prepare for the assassination.
When Victor Hedgman concluded his testimony, he was offered an
opportunity to give his opinion of the assassination plot. He responded
that he was not convinced of the righteousness of the act. However,
since he believed that the order was issued "from an authorized
authority," he felt that it would have been his duty to carry out that
order.34
The purpose of the poison which would create a circumstance
resembling a natural death was to enable the United States plausibly to
deny any involvement in the assassination. The concept of "plausible
denial" deserves special attention. The original purpose and use of the
doctrine of plausible denial was to avoid attribution to the United
States for covert operations. The intent of this practice was both to
protect the operatives abroad, often operating under assumed per-
sonalities for the purpose of carrying on espionage activities, as well as
to maintain United States government integrity. The Senate Commit-
tee on Alleged Assassination Plots found that this concept
has been expanded to mask decisions of the President and his senior
staff members. A further consequence of the expansion of this doc-
trine is that subordinates, in an effort to permit their superiors to
"plausibly deny" operations, fail to fully inform them about these
operations. "Plausible denial" can also lead to the use of euphemism
and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and
other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be
disclosed. The converse may also occur; a President could com-
municate his desire for a sensitive operation in an indirect, cir-
cumlocutious manner. An additional possibility is that the President
may, in fact, not be fully and accurately informed about a sensitive
operation because he failed to receive the "circumlocutious"
message.3 5
The Committee further concludes that the problems of extended
license taken by the CIA operatives in the assassination attempts
described in the report, may well have been caused by the extended
use of the doctrine of plausible denial.
The overall conclusions of the Senate Committee were that political
assassination is not an acceptable means of causing political change,
4Id. at 70. This was the last paragraph of the Senate Committee's account of
their investigation into the death of Lumumba.
151d. at 11-12.
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and that there should be a law in effect to prevent the practice of
assassination. President Ford had asked the committee to examine the
issue of assassination and in a press conference of June 9, 1975, he
said, "I am opposed to political assassination. This administration has
not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy."
The Committee made the following recommendation:
The Committee recommends a statute which would make it a
criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States (1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to
assassinate a foreign official; (2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign
official, or (3) to assassinate a foreign official.56
In response to allegations in the press, Richard Helms, then Director
of Central Intelligence, issued a directive in 1972 ordering that no per-
son in his organization would be permitted to carry on any assassina-
tion operation or assist or suggest such an operation to others. In 1973,
William Colby issued a similar order after he had assumed the position
of Director. 7 The Committee obviously did not feel that the CIA
directives were sufficient for the prevention of future operations which
would violate the guidelines they felt necessary to contain covert opera-
tions. The recommendation for a statute making it a federal crime to
engage in assassination makes it evident that the Committee found a
need for stronger controls on covert activity.
Helms testified that his reasons for issuing the directive disallowing
assassination were not limited to moral principles. He explained that it
is nearly impossible to conceal an assassination plot operating under a
democracy. A leak would develop through the press or through an
operative who reports to a Congressman. The second practical reason
for his ban on assassination, Helms explained, was the replacement of
the target victim. Who would assume power after the death of the
foreign leader at the hands of the assassin? It is quite likely that the
United States would not stand in any better position than it had prior
to the assassination.3 8 Considering the possibility that, should the plot
be discovered, the succeeding leader might destroy any political gains
S6Id. at 283. It was the Committee's intention to close off all posibilities of an
assassination involving the United States without a criminal sanction. The only in-
cidence of assassination not considered by the Committee, nor disallowed by the pro-
posed law, was an assassination under the permissible laws of organized warfare.
STId. at 282.
38 d.
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the United States might have hoped to achieve, even in the light of
plausible denial, such operations may be disadvantageous.
D. Assassination and International Law
Concerning the legality of a foreign assault on a national leader,
there is no specific treaty or agreement between nations disallowing
assassination by a foreign power in the absence of a state war. The act
of one state interfering in the domestic affairs of another, without
regard to the will of the latter, for the purpose of maintaining or alter-
ing the conditions within it, constitutes an act of intervention. 9 Accor-
ding to Moore's International Law Digest, "[r]egarded from the point
of view of the state intruded upon [intervention] must always remain
an act which, if not consented to, is an act of war. '40 It would appear
that the act of assassination could be interpreted as the commence-
ment of a war and that an assassination in the absence of a war could
not, by definition, exist. However, intervention is not always classed as
political. Non-political intervention occurs when one nation acts to
protect its citizens in a foreign country. 4 ' The United States was one of
the nations represented at the Convention of 1933 held in Montevideo.
The agreement signed by the American republics on December 26,
provides that no state shall have the right to intervene in the internal
or external affairs of another signatory state. 4 The fact that the
governments which signed this agreement saw fit to include a provision
disallowing intervention implies that there are circumstances which
would allow the action without violation of international law. The
presence of the provision, however, does not determine the legality of
intervention in international law though it does tend to show that
situations may exist where the action would not be illegal.
At the time of the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Republic
of the Congo was only six months old. The assassination plan
perpetrated by the CIA began before the new Republic was two mon-
396 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 2 (1943). The general principles of
this section of the digest, which defines intervention, state, "Prima facie intervention is
a hostile act, because it constitutes an attack upon the independence of the state sub-
jected to it."
401d.
4
'Id. at 247-48. Non-political intervention is an exception to the previous state-
ment that intervention constitutes an act of war.
421 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1963). The purpose of
the Montevideo Conference was to establish the sovereignty of the several American
nations.
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ths old. The new nation did not sever itself from Belgium by means of
revolution, nor did it abandon the laws imposed by the Belgian col-
onialists. Although it may be inconceivable that the Republic of the
Congo would maintain the colonial laws which created the class system
placing the evolues in a privileged status, it is quite possible that the
new government had every intention of complying with all of the inter-
national agreements by which it was bound a few months earlier. The
new Republic may have been bound by the treaties and international
agreements established during its colonial rule.
The question of the assumption .of an imperial agreement applying
to a newly independent colony is answered in two parts. First, it is
necessary to determine whether the treaty was applicable to the colony
before independence, and second, whether the treaty rights and
obligations continue to apply to the independent nation and the na-
tions with which the agreement was made. According to Vattel, the
territory of a nation includes its colonies.4 a Whenever one nation
makes an agreement with another, the agreement shall apply to "all
the possessions of a nation, in whatever place they may be situated and
whatever may be the distance that separates them."' "4 According to
Hackworth, the international agreements of a state are applicable to
its colonies.
As a general rule territory of the annexed or incorporated state
becomes impressed with the treaties of the acquiring state, so far as
they are not locally inapplicable. This matter is usually the subject of
an understanding between the annexing state and other treaty states
at the time of the annexation, or of an affirmative declaration by the
annexing state acquiesced in by other treaty countries.4 5
It appears that since Belgium acquired the Belgian Congo as a colony,
the Congo acquired the treaty agreements of Belgium.
When the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) attained its in-
dependence, the United States requested the new government to
disclose its intentions regarding the treaty agreements between the
United States and the Republic. The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)
had acquired its independence from France by peaceful settlement
similar in manner to the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville). In a
411 J. MOORE, supra note 39, at 18. Vattel is quoted in this digest as the authori-
ty for the statement that a colony is subject to all of the treaties and international
agreements of the ruling power.
"4Id.
455 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 42, at 376-77.
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reply of August 5, 1961, the Foreign Affairs Ministry explained the
understanding of the new government:
In accordance with the practices of international law and because
of the circumstances under which the Republic of Congo attained in-
ternational sovereignty, the latter considers itself to be a party to the
treaties and agreements signed prior to its independence by the
French Republic and extended by the latter to its former overseas
territories, provided that such treaties or agreements have not been
expressly denounced by it or tacitly abrogated by a text replacing
them.4 6
The operation of a newly independent territory in acquiring the inter-
national agreements of its former ruling power is a practice of state
succession. If, as stated by the Ministry of the Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville), the succession of colonial treaties by the newly indepen-
dent state is a practice of international law, then it can be assumed
that the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) likewise assumed the
responsibilities and rights of international agreements which were ap-
plicable to the territory during its colonial rule. This situation leads to
an examination of the agreements between the United States and
Belgium prior to the independence of the Republic.
D. Applicability of Belgium- United States Treaties
In 1882 the United States entered into a treaty with Belgium
whereby the two countries agreed that fugitives from either nation who
were suspected of acts of "murder, assassination, or poisoning" against
the heads of either country or against any member of a leader's family,
would not be considered immune from extradition as would be a per-
son accused of having committed a political offense. 47 This agreement
was reiterated in a 1901 treaty between these same two countries.
Naturally, if either government condoned or conspired in a plot of
assassination, this act would be equivalent to the granting of asylum to
the assassin in the very least. As a colony of Belgium, the Congo was
entitled to the same cooperation from the United States as was
46T.I.A.S. No. 5161; 13 U.S.T. 2065. This statement by the Foreign Affairs
Ministry could probably not be controlling in the creation of an international agree-
ment if it were not merely an affirmation of an intent to comply with general practice
of international law.
4174 J. MooRE, supra note 39, at 352. The treaties made between the United
States and Belgium were not unique. The United States signed similar treaties for ex-
tradition with Russia and Luxembourg. These treaties were concluded shortly after the
assassination of President Garfield in 1871.
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Belgium. The assassination plot against Lumumba originated in the
National Security Council meeting on August 18, 1960.48 At this time
Lumumba was still serving as Prime Minister. He was not dismissed by
Kasavubu until September. 4 Thus the United States was plotting to
assassinate a political head of state, which plot was a violation of the
1901 treaty in the sense that the Republic of the Congo assumed the
treaty rights of Belgium by means of state succession.
The treaties with Belgium, in which the United States agreed to
deny the privileges of a political fugitive to assassins, were not unique.
Similar agreements were made between the United States and the
governments of Luxembourg, Russia, and Denmark. 0 However, this
arrangement is not universally held between the United States and all
other nations.
In 1897 and 1898, the United States signed treaties of extradition
with Brazil in which acts of assassination were considered political
crimes and therefore not applicable to national extradition unless the
assassination is "unconnected with political movements and is such as
to constitute murder.. " This restriction on the rights and obliga-
tions of the two countries in the surrendering of fugitive assassins ap-
plies to 'acts committed against the president or vice-president of the
United States and against the governor or lieutenant-governor of any
state and to acts committed against the Brazilian counterparts to such
American officeholders. 52 In effect, this restriction gives either the
United States or Brazil the power to grant refuge to an assassin from
the other country. Whether either government would grant asylum to
an assassin is academic; the laws between the two nations permit such
action.
The extradition of a fugitive is not always performed as a legal
obligation. In 1866, the government of Egypt assisted in the capture of
John H. Surratt in Alexandria, and placed him aboard an American
man-of-war.53 Surratt was charged with complicity in the assassination
of President Lincoln. At the time Surratt was extradited, there existed
no treaty, formal or informal, between the United States and Egypt for
48SENATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 13.
49 d. at 14.
504 J. MooRE, supra note 39, at 352.
5 Id. at 353.
5 Id.
"Id. Egypt was under no obligation to surrender Surratt to American authorities.
The action of the Egyptian government was carried out as a matter of discretion.
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the refusal of asylum to political fugitives accused of assassination. Ex-
tradition of a political assassin exists, therefore, even in the absence of
a written treaty between nations requiring it.
E. Conclusions of Legality in the Assassination Plot Against Patrice
Lumumba
There are three factors applicable to a determination of the legali-
ty of the assassination plot perpetrated by the CIA against Lumumba.
A first concern is whether any treaty obligations exist by virtue of the
state succession of Belgian international agreements applicable to the
Congo after independence. Next, one should weigh the influence of
contrary agreements existing between the United States and other na-
tional governments on the effectiveness of the old Belgian treaties. A
final concern is the effect of precedential acts of extradition such as
that of Surratt by Egypt.
The Republic of the Congo did not abrogate the treaties applicable
to it under Belgian colonial rule. Therefore, if the treaty between the
United States and Belgium was not inapplicable to the Congo, the
treaty continued in force between the United States and the new
Republic of the Congo. 54 If this treaty was effective after the in-
dependence of the Belgian Congo, through the operation of state suc-
cession under international law, then the United States was in violation
of that treaty when the CIA plotted to assassinate Lumumba.
The existence of treaties and agreements contrary to that between
the United States and Belgium, does not serve to negate the effec-
tiveness of the treaty succeeded to by the Republic of the Congo. The
existence of treaties serves only to establish a general rule of interna-
tional law where no agreement between nations has been formalized. If
the Republic succeeded to the treaty rights that existed between the
United States and Belgium, the rights and obligations between the
United States and Brazil would not have any effect on a determination
of the international law involving the Congo.
Egypt's extradition of John Surratt did not increase the efficacy of
the Belgian treaty. Egypt had no obligation to grant asylum to an
American accused of assassination, nor was the Egyptian government
obligated to assist in the apprehension of a fugitive assassin. Egypt
assisted the United States government as a matter of comity and as an
effort to maintain good relations between the two countries. Such acts
54T.I.A.S. No. 5161, supra note 46.
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can not be considered as controlling precedents when agreements to
operate in a contrary manner exist.
Of the three factors, only the first is controlling. It is most likely
that if the U.S.-Belgium treaty was not inapplicable to the Republic of
the Congo, then the Republic succeeded to that treaty, and the United
States was in violation of the treaty when plotting the assassination of
Patrice Lumumba.
II. IDI AMIN DADA
A. Background
In the first week of February, 1971, President Apolo Milton Obote
attempted a purge of his military staff in the central African nation of
Uganda. Major General Idi Amin Dada directed an assault against
Obote and sucessfully carried off the twenty-seventh coup d'6tat in
black Africa since Patrice Lumumba's assassination.55 The revolution
lasted a little more than sixteen hours, at the end of which time Idi
Amin announced himself the new President of Uganda.16 Amin was
able to defeat Obote by organizing the army and centralizing authority
over the military in himself. When Obote lost control of the military
he also lost control of the government. The attempted purge of the
military high command came too late.
Idi (Big Daddy) Amin Dada was a career soldier, signing into the
British colonial army as a young man. He held the Uganda
heavyweight boxing championship while serving as a colonial soldier,
and retired undefeated in 1960.1 7 Amin had served in a British com-
mand but the military training for his troops was provided by the
Israeli government.5 8 Amin rose through the ranks of the British
military and then, much more rapidly, through the Ugandan army
when in 1966 he was made armed forces chief of staff.
Obote had gained power prior to the independence of Uganda in
1963 by promising to maintain the identity of the four kingdoms.5 9
"SUganda: Big Daddy Takes Charge, TIME, Feb. 8, 1971, at 38.
5Id.
57Uganda: Big Daddy, TIME, Feb. 14, 1972, at 30.
18TIME, supra note 55.
"Id. Sir Edward Mutesa II was the Kabaka (King) of Buganda, the largest of the
four kingdoms that comprise Uganda. Mutesa desired to maintain his sovereignty as
Kabaka. Obote first allied himself to Mutesa, serving as Prime Minister during
Mutesa's Presidency. However, in 1966, Obote took command of the government,
dismissing Mutesa, and established a central governmental control. Mutesa was forced
into exile and later died in England.
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When independence from Britian was granted, Sir Edward Mutesa II,
the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, became president of the new govern-
ment and Obote became Prime Minister. However, Obote centralized
his authority and Mutesa was forced into exile.6 0 Obote continued to
increase his control over the country by use of emergency powers. His
last attempt to strengthen his position was the failure which brought
Amin to the head of the government.
The new leader of the Ugandan government was seen initially as a
welcome relief from tyranny. Time magazine reported on the coup
d'itat and pictured Idi Amin with the caption "More amicable than
ambitious." '6' There were promises of new elections, greater freedoms,
and a return of Mutesa's body to his native soil, but there was to be no
return to the autonomy of the four kingdoms. Amin was retaining the
centralized government control.
The hopes of personal freedom and peaceful government did not
last long in Uganda. In March 1972, Amin ordered all of his Israeli
military advisers out of the country on the grounds that they were plot-
ting sabotage against his country. Then in August of 1972, Amin
ordered the eighty thousand Asians then living in Uganda to leave the
country. 62 There were few exceptions to the Asian banishment and at
least fifty thousand people were compelled to leave the country within
three months. Amin claimed the order of expulsion came to him in a
dream: "God was directing me to act immediately to save the situa-
tion. . . 65 The more apparent reason for the order was the plight of
the economy. Since coming to power in 1971, Amin had spent lavishly
on the military budget 64 and as a result Uganda was now on the verge
of bankruptcy. The Asians held the majority of the skilled and profes-
sional jobs in Uganda and comprised the vast majority of the Ugandan
601d.
611d. Idi Amin was an obscure figure in 1971 when he took over the government,
and anyone was thought to be an improvement over the deposed Obote.
62Uganda: Men Without a Country, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1972, at 27-28. The
order of expulsion varied from one moment to the next, as Amin changed his mind to
allow those Asians with Ugandan citizenship to remain and then denied them that
right. Amin did permit certain trained professionals to remain in the country, but the
atmosphere was not pleasant.6SId. at 28.
64Amin's Uganda: From Dreams to Brutality, THE NATION, Nov. 13, 1972, at
464-65. A full three-quarters of the capital budget was spent for arms and supplies for
the military. Most of this money had been set aside for schools, roads, and other
similar projects.
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middle class. It is quite likely that Amin hoped to gain some capital
for his national debt through the confiscation of the Asians' property.
At the very least, the expulsion order would distract the attention of
the people away from the starving economy. Asians were told to sell
their possessions and their businesses, but there was simply no market
for anything the Asians had to sell. The black Ugandans soon were
able to collect whatever was left behind. The Asians were permitted to
take only the equivalent of $140 per family, and the balance of their
savings was expropriated by the government."5 Although an extension
for the exodus was permitted, and permission granted to twenty thou-
sand Asians to stay. (these were mostly professionals and irreplacable
skilled technicians), the order was enforced and approximately fifty-
two thousand Asians left Uganda.
Amin did not assist the banished thousands in the compliance of
his order but, on the contrary, took actions which hindered the
emigration. Although Britain did not want to accept thousands of
Asian immigrants, many of them held British passports and many were
British citizens. Prime Minister Edward Heath declared that Britain
would not deny the Asians a refuge and would live up to its obliga-
tions, but that he hoped that other countries would take some of the
homeless. 66 British-owned air lines began to airlift the iefugees out of
Uganda, but in mid-September Amin ordered that the Asians should
be removed by East Africa Airways, a company partly owned by Ugan-
da. The airline was too small for such an enormous job, and to make
matters worse, Amin raised the fares to an amount equal to $106 more
per passenger than the British airlines had charged.6 7 The army which
Amin pampered and kept well armed, was set loose on the country to
do as they pleased. Ugandan soldiers have reportedly robbed, beaten,
and murdered thousands of Ugandan residents. During the exodus the
troops harrassed and often robbed the exiled Asians.
The injustices associated with the expulsion order were overshadowed
in the last week of September 1972 by the activities of a revolutionary
force calling themselves the Uganda People's Militia. Well-armed and
"Uganda: The Outcast's Story, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1972, at 61.
"6Uganda: Flight of the Asians, TIME. Sept. 11, 1972, at 27. Canada did agree to
accept five thousand of the homeless Asians and the United States took in about one
thousand.
6 1d. at 27-28. The fare charged by the British airlines was approximately $168.
After Amin ordered that only East Africa Airways would be allowed to remove the un-
wanted Asians, he demanded that a fare of $274 per passenger be charged.
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trained, the small army, only about eight hundred strong, entered
Uganda across -the Tanzanian border. 6 The rebel band, comprised
mostly of former soldiers and police from the Obote regime, gained a
stronghold but were hopelessly outnumbered when the loyalist troops
returned. Most of the rebels were killed in the battle and the invasion
plan was a complete failure.
The foreign reaction to Ida Amin's injustices has been one of,
economic retaliation. The United States withdrew a three million
dollar agricultural assistance loan, 69 and Britain canceled a twenty-
four million dollar loan to Uganda.70 This tactic of using economic in-
fluence to condemn the outrageous behavior of exile and brutality has
not been successful in securing the saftey of foreign nationals in Uganda.
The economic club wielded against Amin has certainly accomplished
little when used as a weapon to insure the human rights of the Ugan-
dan citizens.
Amin has been able to cement his power through a series of
purges, which have been arbitrarily directed against the different tribal
factions in the country. At first, Amin began by removing members of
Obote's tribe, the Langi, from positions of command in the military.
The vacancies were filled by members of Amin's own tribe, the
Kakwa, and also by members of the Lugbara.7 1 In April 1974, three
years after assuming power, Amin's purges had cost the lives of be-
tween twenty and ninety thousand people.7 2 The Lugbara, suspecting
that they in turn might not be safe from the madness of the tyrant,
feared that they might -become the target of the next purge. The
highest ranking officer of the Lugbara tribe was murdered and the
Lugbara retaliated. 7" The plot included an assassination strike against
"Uganda: The Black Hole of Kampala, TIME, Oct. 2, 1972, at 32.
"Amin: Shades of Hitler, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1972, at 61.
7 Uganda: A Genuinely Black State, TIME, Dec. 18, 1972, at 40.
"Uganda: Threnody for the Rebels, TIME, Apr. 8, 1974, at 40. There were
purges aimed at the Baganda tribe of Kabaka Mutesa under the dictatorship of Obote.
Amin then turned the same vengeance against Obote's Langi and the once favored
Acholi, and eventually the Lugbara. It would be difficult for Amin to engage in an
actual tribal genocide against these three tribes since these are three of the four largest
tribes in Uganda and comprise well over half of the population of the country.
However, Amin has caused the deaths of thousands of his own countrymen and per-,
mitted his troops to murder tens of thousands more.
7*Id.
s"Id. The officer, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ondoga, was serving as Foreign
Minister at the time of his death.
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Amin which failed. It was hypothesized that the murder of the
Lugbara officer was a machination calculated by Amin to incite the
revolt, thereby justifying the purge of all Lugbara soldiers. 74 The coup
was smashed and Amin began the reprisals, killing both soldiers and
civilians for suspected participation in the revolt. Amin is reported to
have said shortly after this coup attempt: "If you are unhappy with
me, then kill me or make me resign and don't disturb the people at
night by running about shooting."75
The question to be asked is, whether Amin's removal practicably
can be accomplished by either of the two methods. It is certainly
doubtful that Idi Amin would ever resign. He has declared himself the
President for Life of Uganda, and if his death is the only means of his
retirement, it may be that assassination is the only means of bringing
about that retirement.
B. Signs of Misrule: Rationale for Elimination
Idi Amin has produced a long series of outrages since he took
power in 1971. He has often surprised the world with his comments,
which he makes under the guise of giving advice to the leaders of other
nations. In 1972, during the expulsion of the Asians, Amin charged
that he had uncovered a British plot to assassinate him, and then sent
a message to Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, and Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel, defending the terrorist
attack at the Munich Olympics. Amin also praised Adolph Hitler for
his persecution of the Jews.
Germany is the right place, where Hitler was Prime Minister and
supreme commander, he burnt over 6 million Jews . . . .This is
because Hitler and all German people knew that the Israelis are not
people who are working in the interest of the people of the world,
and that is why they burnt the Israelis alive with gas in the soil of
GermanyK16
It was at this time that the United States decided to withhold the three
million dollar agricultural assistance loan.
In January of 1975, Amin declared that he planned to make a visit
to Great Britain, where he would like to meet with the fifty thousand
Asians whom he had "booted out" of Uganda.77 By this time five
74d.
75 1d.
7eNEWSWEEK, supra note 69.
"Uganda: Murderous Anarchy, TIME, Feb. 10, 1975, at 37.
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African heads of state had leaked information that they would support
a coup against Amin, and at least three other African national heads
had let it be known they were not opposed to an anti-Amin coup
d'6tat. 78 Later in 1975, Amin had a British writer imprisoned for
writing that Amin was a "village tyrant." The author, Dennis Hills,
was ordered to be executed. Britain sent Major General lain Grahame
and Lieutenant General Sir Chandos Blair to deliver a plea from
Queen Elizabeth for the life of Hills. The two officers had been Amin's
commanding officers during the period of Britain's colonial rule in
Uganda. At first, Amin seemed willing to cancel the execution but
then announced that Hills would die on July 4 unless the British
Foreign Secretary came to Uganda. Amin was enraged when Blair
walked out of the meeting. Amin denounced the British and their two
messengers and ordered his army to a full alert to prepare for a British
invasion. When the British attempted to calm the situation with pro-
mises of a fresh start in Anglo-Ugandan relations, Amin announced
that more than seven hundred British citizens living in Uganda had
been arrested and charged with espionage.7 9 In September 1972, when
there were seven thousand britons living in Uganda, Amin had
ordered that all of them be placed under surveillance, explaining that
the "British crooks" were trying to assassinate him. He also accused
Great Britain of planning an invasion of Uganda by "land, sea, and
air."80 It is doubtful that anyone would correct or contradict the dic-
tator, but when it was pointed out that Uganda is about five hundred
miles form the nearest seaport, Amin declared that British Foreign
Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home had betrayed his "ignorance about
Africa" by his foolish military tactics.8i
With the numerous purges in the military, there is still no lack of
personnel. Amin continues to fill the vacancies he creates with ap-
78Id. Two nations most likely to have been so opposed to Amin as to allow their
opposition to become known are South Africa and Rhodesia. Amin has threatened war
against these two nations and has even staged a mock invasion of an island in Lake
Victoria, supposedly a simulation and preparation for the invasion of Cape Town,
South Africa.
7 Uganda: Trick or Treat, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1975, at 35. Prime Minister
Harold Wilson later agreed to send the Foreign Secretary to negotiate the new "fresh
start" in international affairs. Amin released Hills almost immediately after Callaghan
arrived. In the presence of both Hills and Callaghan, Amin declared that "This proves
I am not mad."
8 0Uganda: God Help the People, TIME, Sept. 25, 1972, at 32.
'Id. at 33.
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pointments of officers and staff, often from his own Kakwa tribe, but
always with the qualification that the new appointees be loyal to their
leader. The problem arising from the new appointments is that there is
no longer any source of training for the new soldiers and the growing
army. Before the coup which brought Amin to power, the Ugandan
army was trained by Israeli troops and advisers, and supplied by Great
Britain.82 Since Amin expelled the Israelis, there has been no qualified
training for the army. The new recruits are poorly trained and there is
no discipline. 83 The officers are likewise unfit for their positions. Amin
has not let the lack of quality in his military stop him from lavishing a
huge portion of his overstretched budget on it.
When Amin expelled the Israelis from Uganda, he began the
purge of all the Langi officers in the army.8 4 The Langi is the native
tribe of Amin's predecessor, Obote. Obote had also favored the Acholi
tribe and Amin set about removing them also. To replace the missing
officers, Amin promoted a few sergeants to the rank of colonel. One
reason for the removal of the Langi and Acholi is Amin's religious
zeal. Amin is a devout, perhaps fanatical, Moslem and the Langi and
Acholi are -predominantly Christian. 8
With the army in such a state of untrained, undisciplined
savagery, there have been continual attacks on civilians by the
military. An estimate of between fifty thousand and two hundred fifty
thousand deaths have been attributed to Amin and his army during
the first four years after his coup.8 6 Many of the Asians who were ex-
pelled in 1972 told tales of being beaten and robbed by soldiers. Ap-
parently, a free license to loot and kill innocent civilians is a reward to
the troops in return for their loyalty to Amin. The only fear a soldier
need have is the fear that Amin, at any time, may decide that his par-
ticular tribe is no longer loyal.
82 Uganda: Emperor Amin, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1972, at 51. On his military
tunic, Amin still continued to wear a British campaign ribbon and an Israeli
paratrooper's wings after those two nations had been ordered to remove all of their
military personnel and advisers from Uganda.
13THE NATION, supra note 64, at 463.
8"Id.
85TIME, supra note 71, at 40.
86s Africa Ready for Amin?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 41. The report of the
death tolls is derived from the International Commission of Jurists, who investigated
the violence in Uganda and published their findings in 1975. The officers rule as petty
tyrants, answerable only to Amin. Persons offending soldiers may be shot immediately.
The Commission was quoted as saying that Amin has "ushered in a reign of terror
worse than anything in recent African history."
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All of the rages, accusations, and threats would seem to indicate
that Amin is imbalanced; he certainly is not rational. There have been
suggestions that Amin may be suffering from the prolonged effects of
syphilitic infection, but Henry Kyemba, Uganda's former Minister of
Health, claims that Amin stages his fits of rage purely for effect. 8 7
For all of the death and brutality that has been wrought in Ugan-
da under the dictatorship of Idi Amin, it is not inconceivable that his
assassination might be a humanitarian act. However, if Amin is not
deposed from power by his own people, who would have a right to
remove him by assassination or any other means?
C. Legality of an Assassination of Idi Amin by a Foreign Government
Assassination is an accepted method of carrying on war between
nations.8 8 Grotius describes the act of assassination, performed by an
enemy who has no ties of faith to the leader, as a lawful act.8 9 He
draws a distinction, however, between this form of assassin and the
assassin who is bound to the leader by a tie of faith such as a guest of
the leader, a soldier in the army acting for hire in the interest of the
enemy, or a subject of the murdered king. 90 Vattel clarifies the posi-
tion taken by Grotius and agrees with him. According to Vattel, the
killing of an enemy leader, by an opposing soldier, is a lawful act. 91
However, the act of poisoning, or the treacherous killing of a leader by
a servant or vassal is in violation of the laws of nations. 92 Of course,
both of the authors agree that the legality of the act of assassination
depends on the existence of a state of war.
There are much more recent, and more authoritative, laws dealing
with the practice of assassination in wartime. Article Three of the
Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits the murder of persons taking no
"Uganda: Big Daddy.in Books, TIME, Sept. 19, 1977, at 46. There is a theory
that the trouble started in Uganda when Amin made his 1971 pilgrimage to Mecca.
When he arrived, it rained in the holy city for the first time in over half a year. Amin
believed that this was a sign of his divine appointment. Kyemba, in his book, explains
that Amin's ruthlessness has a long history, going back in his military career as far as
the colonial service. See H. KYEMBA, A STATE OF BLOOD (1977).
aThere are a number of examples cited by authorities such as Grotius and Vattel
for "honorable assassination" in war, e.g., Theodotus' attempt on the life of Ptolemy,
and Scaevola's attempt to kill an enemy leader.
893 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS 88-90 (Amsterdam 1632).
90 d. at 89.
913 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONs 359 (London 1797).
92d. at 358-60.
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active part in the hostilities of a civil war. 93 Of course there are
generally national laws against murder as well as international ac-
cords.9 4 This statement of international law was not adhered to during
the Vietnamese War, in which the murder of minor officials was prac-
ticed as a means of terrorizing the villagers and undermining the con-
fidence in the government.9 5 Guerilla warfare and terrorist tactics have
become a common means of attempting to achieve a political end, but
practice does not necessarily imply legality. The current status of per-
missible assassination in wartime appears to allow the killing of a
leader contributing to the hostilities by either uniformed personnel of a
specific strike force, or non-uniformed personnel, even if these persons
should include individuals who are subject to the rule of the victim of
the assassination. 96 The problem with the permissible forms of
assassination in international law is that these are premised on the con-
dition of an active state of war.
A foreign government which authorizes or assists in the assassina-
tion of Idi Amin would commit an act of intervention. Such interven-
tion, absent a valid non-political purpose, would constitute an act of
war. 97 The most common form of non-political intervention is the pro-
tection of a nation's citizens against the wrongs and injustices of a
foreign power. 98 In the first two years of his rule Amin's troops
mistreated American residents far worse than any other group of
foreigners with the possible exception of the banished Asians. 99 This
injustice and persecution could give rise to American intervention in
defense of its citizens. If Amin is the cause of the wrongs committed
against American citizens, could his assassination be construed as a
non-political intervention?
If the assassination were treated as a non-political act for the
defense of American citizens, four problems arise. The first issue is the
difficulty of convincing the new President of Uganda to accept the
assassination as non-political. It is likely that anyone who might
93J. Kelly, Assassination in War Time, 30 MIL. L. REv. 109 (1965). The author
details the laws and treaties between nations dealing with assassination in time of war
only. However, he states that even in this context the law is unclear.
94Id.
"Id. "It has been estimated that over ten thousand village officials were killed by
the Viet Cong between 1956 and 1960." Id. at 109 n.22.
Id. at 111.
97J. MOORE, supra note 39.
WId. at 247-48.
99THE NATION, supra note 64, at 465-66.
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replace Amin would follow his example, since all of Amin's cabinet
and military personnel have achieved their positions through their
loyalty to Amin. The second problem is the lack of control over the ar-
my. Soldiers in Uganda are undisciplined and a new commander pro-
bably could not restrain their acts of violence, even if he should desire
to do so. The third difficulty is that the assassination of Amin could
very likely cause reprisals against those persons the United States
sought to protect. It does not seem to be a viable method of defending
American interests, when the action simply provokes the injustice.
Lastly, the prestige of the United States would be greatly diminished if
the world community found out that it helped assassinate a foreign
leade-r. 10 0 Considering these practical arguments against assassination,
the act appears to be counter-productive. Therefore, if the assassina-
tion can not be shown to be a viable means of protecting the interests
and safeguarding the lives of citizens in a foreign land, then the act
would appear to be political, rather than non-political intervention.
Of course, the primary reason for the inability of the United States
to assassinate a foreign leader is that such action would violate the rule
promulgated by the Senate Committee which investigated and con-
demned assassination plots in foreign policy. 1"
III. CONCLUSIONS
The assassination plot perpetrated by the CIA was an act of
political intervention, and as such was a violation of international law.
By operation of state succession, the Republic of the Congo inherited
the treaty rights of Belgium, and the plot against Patrice Lumumba,
Prime Minister of the Republic, was a violation of the U.S.-Belgian
agreements for the extradition of political assassins.
An attempt on the life of Idi Amin would be an act of political in-
tervention, and thus would constitute an act of war. If a foreign power
were to desire the removal of Amin by assassination, the possibility of
war with Uganda must be considered as a consequence.
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